The encrypted-workspace comparison matrix.
10 workspace and messaging vendors, scored across 16 privacy-architecture attributes — key custody, end-to-end encryption surface, metadata posture, recovery model. Free to reuse with attribution.
This dataset is published under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 license. Researchers, journalists, and other comparison sites are welcome to reuse it — just credit Koaich with a link back to this page.
Koaich. "Encrypted Workspace & Messaging Comparison Matrix (2026)." koaich.com, https://koaich.com/compare/matrix-2026. Licensed CC-BY 4.0.Koaich | Slack | Notion | Google Workspace | Microsoft Teams | Discord | Signal | SMS | Facebook Messenger | LinkedIn messages | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| E2E encrypted messages by default | Yes | No | n/a | No | Only 1:1 calls (opt-in) | No (DAVE for voice only) | Yes | No | Yes (since late 2024) | No | Yes (Signal Protocol) |
| E2E encrypted documents | Yes | n/a | No | CSE on Enterprise Plus only | Customer Key on E5 only | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a |
| E2E encrypted files | Yes | No | No | CSE on Enterprise Plus only | Customer Key on E5 only | No | Yes (attachments in chats) | n/a | Yes (in E2E chats) | No | Yes (attachments in E2E chats) |
| Can the vendor read your content? | No | Yes | Yes | Yes (default tiers) | Yes (default tiers) | Yes | No | Yes (carrier reads all) | No (content); Yes (metadata) | Yes | No (content); Yes (metadata) |
| Send to a non-platform recipient via email (encrypted) | Yes (encrypted digest) | No | Shared link (cleartext) | Yes (cleartext) | No | No | No | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a |
| Group key rotation on member churn | Yes (Sender-Key rotation) | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | n/a | Yes (Signal Protocol groups) | n/a | Yes (Signal Protocol) |
| Message TTL / auto-expiration | Yes, every message | Workspace retention policies | No | Retention policies | Retention policies | Premium, channel-level | Yes | No | Disappearing messages (opt-in per chat) | No | Disappearing messages (opt-in per chat) |
| Per-vault key isolation | Yes | No (workspace-wide) | No | No | No | No | n/a | n/a | No (account-wide keys) | n/a | No (account-wide keys) |
| Recovery without vendor-held keys | Yes (Shamir + WebAuthn) | No (password reset by vendor) | No | No | No (AD reset) | No | Yes (PIN) | n/a | Encrypted backups (opt-in PIN) | No (password reset) | Encrypted backups (opt-in PIN) |
| Operator business model | Subscription (no ad-targeting) | — | — | — | — | — | Non-profit (no ads) | Carrier subscription | Advertising (Meta) | Advertising + premium (Microsoft) | Advertising (Meta) |
| Account identity tied to broader profile | No (Koaich account only) | — | — | — | — | — | No (phone or username) | Phone number (carrier-bound) | Yes (Facebook profile) | Yes (LinkedIn profile + Microsoft) | Yes (phone number, Meta-linked) |
| Cloud backup encrypted end-to-end | Yes (by design) | — | — | — | — | — | Yes (Signal-managed) | n/a (carrier-stored) | Opt-in (PIN required) | — | Opt-in (PIN required, since 2021) |
| Contact list visible to vendor | No (encrypted client-side) | — | — | — | — | — | No (kept on device) | Yes (carrier address book sync varies) | Yes (Facebook contacts + uploaded) | Yes (entire network is the address book) | Yes (full phone-book upload by default) |
| Contact lookup uses keyed HMAC (vs. cleartext email) | Yes (email_hmac) | — | — | — | — | — | Yes (private contact discovery via SGX) | n/a | No (cleartext) | No (cleartext) | No (cleartext phone numbers uploaded) |
| Sealed-sender (vendor can't see who sent the message) | No (roadmap — see PRD) | — | — | — | — | — | Yes | No (carrier sees everything) | No | No | No |
| Post-quantum hybrid key agreement (1:1) | Yes (hybrid) | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | Yes (PQXDH) | No | Not announced | No | Not announced |
The analysis and viewpoints on this page are based on Koaich's internal review of each vendor's publicly available documentation, marketing claims, transparency reports, and disclosed incidents at the time of writing. These viewpoints have not been independently audited. Vendor capabilities, terms, and architectures change. If a specific claim here is inaccurate or out of date, please write to hello@koaich.com and we'll review and correct it.
See /methodology for our research process and the full list of sources we cite per vendor. Legal disclaimer at /terms.
Why we publish this openly
The question that decides workspace privacy is the same one for every vendor: who holds the keys? A comparison is only trustworthy if you can check the inputs and reuse them. So the matrix is open data, the sources are public on the methodology page, and corrections go to hello@koaich.com. If a cell is wrong, tell us and we'll fix the source of truth — this page and the JSON update together.