Privileged communications, by design.
Your current client portal can be subpoenaed. Ours can't. When compelled process comes through us, what we produce is ciphertext under keys we don't hold. The structural case for privilege holds at the cryptography layer — not at the vendor-policy layer.
FREE 3-MINUTE PRIVILEGE-DEFENSE AUDIT→What you get
Sealed client intake
Clients submit inquiries through a sealed portal. Their message is encrypted to your public key on their device — our servers store ciphertext only. You respond through the same E2E thread. No cleartext ever leaves the client's browser.
Per-matter vault isolation
Each client matter has its own encryption boundary. Your associate sees Matter A, your paralegal sees Matter B — there is no shared key that opens both. Cross-matter exposure is architecturally impossible.
Encrypted client messaging
Every exchange with your client is encrypted on-device before it leaves their browser or app. Post-quantum hybrid key agreement (X25519 + ML-KEM-1024) protects the key exchange even against a future adversary recording traffic today.
Secure document delivery to clients without Koaich
Send a brief, settlement draft, or sensitive attachment to a client who doesn't use Koaich. They receive a metadata-only email; the document decrypts on their device, re-encrypted under their key. We never hold the plaintext in transit.
Minimal disclosure surface
If our infrastructure receives a subpoena or compelled process, what we can produce is account existence, authentication metadata, and ciphertext. We cannot produce message bodies, document contents, or file data — we don't hold the decryption keys.
TTL-controlled retention
Messages can self-expire. The discovery footprint of draft deliberations and working communications shrinks by default — without requiring a retention policy debate with opposing counsel.
The underlying cryptography
Every claim above is grounded in a specific primitive. Not marketing.
- →X25519 + ML-KEM-1024 (NIST FIPS 203) hybrid key agreement for 1:1 attorney-client threads — same class as Signal PQXDH, ahead of WhatsApp
- →Sender-Key group messaging with automatic key rotation on member removal — for matter teams
- →Per-document symmetric keys wrapped to each authorized recipient — no shared vault key
- →WebAuthn passkeys for authentication — the key never leaves your authenticator
- →Shamir's Secret Sharing across your own devices for recovery — no vendor-held master key
Get on the waitlist.
We're onboarding legal practice first. Read the architecture if you want detail.